on the lower Rappahannock.[1] During this time Johnston would,—so McClellan expected,—be occupied in withdrawing his army and stores to the neighborhood of Richmond; but McClellan expected to be beforehand with his antagonist, and " to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly reinforced." *

But, in the first place, who could be sure that Johnston would take this view of his true course under the circumstances ? Who could be certain that he would not content himself with sending 20,000 men to Richmond, and then, after the bulk of the Federal army had embarked, cross the Potomac at the head of 80,000 men, and march on Baltimore or Philadelphia?[8] No one can doubt that such a step would be followed by the instant recall of McClellan. In such an emergency, the President and his advisers could not afford to hesitate a moment; and they would not have hesitated. McClellan's campaign would have been abruptly brought to an end, but very probably not before the prestige of the Union had received a serious blow. It is true that we now know that Johnston, instead of having 100,000 men, had hardly half that number; but in passing upon McClelland plan we must assume the correctness of the figures which he accepted an correct. That Johnston made no offensive movement of

this kind was probably due to the fact that his force was so small

[1] It took about five weeks to transport 120,000 men to Fort Monroe, 5 W. R., 46.

[2] McClellan to Stanton, 5 W, R., 45.

[3] This plan was suggested as late as the middle of April. Smith, C* W. P., 42. €/. Johnston to Lee, April 30, 1862 ; 14 W, R., 477.